46 research outputs found

    Levels of explanation in biological psychology

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    Until recently, the notions of function and multiple realization were supposed to save the autonomy of psychological explanations. Furthermore, the concept of supervenience presumably allows both dependence of mind on brain and non-reducibility of mind to brain, reconciling materialism with an independent explanatory role for mental and functional concepts and explanations. Eliminativism is often seen as the main or only alternative to such autonomy. It gladly accepts abandoning or thoroughly reconstructing the psychological level, and considers reduction if successful as equivalent with elimination. In comparison with the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of biology has developed more subtle and complex ideas about functions, laws, and reductive explanation than the stark dichotomy of autonomy or elimination. It has been argued that biology is a patchwork of local laws, each with different explanatory interests and more or less limited scope. This points to a pluralistic, domain-specific and multi-level view of explanations in biology. Explanatory pluralism has been proposed as an alternative to eliminativism on the one hand and methodological dualism on the other hand. It holds that theories at different levels of description, like psychology and neuroscience, can co-evolve, and mutually influence each other, without the higher-level theory being replaced by, or reduced to, the lower-level one. Such ideas seem to tally with the pluralistic character of biological explanation. In biological psychology, explanatory pluralism would lead us to expect many local and non-reductive interactions between biological, neurophysiological, psychological and evolutionary explanations of mind and behavior. This idea is illustrated by an example from behavioral genetics, where genetics, physiology and psychology constitute distinct but interrelated levels of explanation. Accounting for such a complex patchwork of related explanations seems to require a more sophisticated and precise way of looking at levels than the existing ideas on (reductive and non-reductive) explanation in the philosophy of mind

    Abundances of the elements in the solar system

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    A review of the abundances and condensation temperatures of the elements and their nuclides in the solar nebula and in chondritic meteorites. Abundances of the elements in some neighboring stars are also discussed.Comment: 42 pages, 11 tables, 8 figures, chapter, In Landolt- B\"ornstein, New Series, Vol. VI/4B, Chap. 4.4, J.E. Tr\"umper (ed.), Berlin, Heidelberg, New York: Springer-Verlag, p. 560-63

    Size Doesn't Matter: Towards a More Inclusive Philosophy of Biology

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    notes: As the primary author, O’Malley drafted the paper, and gathered and analysed data (scientific papers and talks). Conceptual analysis was conducted by both authors.publication-status: Publishedtypes: ArticlePhilosophers of biology, along with everyone else, generally perceive life to fall into two broad categories, the microbes and macrobes, and then pay most of their attention to the latter. ‘Macrobe’ is the word we propose for larger life forms, and we use it as part of an argument for microbial equality. We suggest that taking more notice of microbes – the dominant life form on the planet, both now and throughout evolutionary history – will transform some of the philosophy of biology’s standard ideas on ontology, evolution, taxonomy and biodiversity. We set out a number of recent developments in microbiology – including biofilm formation, chemotaxis, quorum sensing and gene transfer – that highlight microbial capacities for cooperation and communication and break down conventional thinking that microbes are solely or primarily single-celled organisms. These insights also bring new perspectives to the levels of selection debate, as well as to discussions of the evolution and nature of multicellularity, and to neo-Darwinian understandings of evolutionary mechanisms. We show how these revisions lead to further complications for microbial classification and the philosophies of systematics and biodiversity. Incorporating microbial insights into the philosophy of biology will challenge many of its assumptions, but also give greater scope and depth to its investigations

    Data from: A framework for detecting natural selection on traits above the species level

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    To what extent can natural selection act on groupings above the species level? Despite extensive theoretical discussion and growing practical concerns over increased rates of global ecological turnover, the question has largely evaded empirical resolution. A flexible and robust hypothesis-testing framework for detecting the phenomenon could facilitate significant progress in resolving this issue. We introduce a permutation-based approach, implemented in the R package perspectev, which provides an explicit test of whether empirical patterns of correlation between upper level trait values and survivorship are reducible to correlations manifested at lower levels. The package is applicable to virtually any nested set of upper- and lower level groupings, a wide variety of upper level traits, and both historical and contemporary occurrence data. We apply this approach to five paleontological data sets that represent different magnitudes of extinction and differ in taxonomic breadth, geological timing and geographic extent. Using simulations, we demonstrate that this method is a robust means of detecting irreducibility in the relationship between upper level traits and survivorship, and outline circumstances in which the method is less effective. We also find evidence consistent with previous findings of selection above the species level for geographic range size in North American K-Pg molluscs and show that this phenomenon was evident for the same molluscan genera globally. Ultimately, we conclude that at certain points in history, some higher level taxonomic groups have survived differentially with respect to geographic range size in a manner that is not explained by the same trait at the species level, and we show that evidence for this phenomenon varies across taxa and extinction events. We release our method as a flexible and easy-to-use R package that will allow others to help determine the relative frequency of this macroevolutionary phenomenon, both in the fossil record and in estimates of contemporary extinction risk
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